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Abstract
In this work, after given the definition of soft sets and their basic op-
erations we define two person soft games which can apply to problems
contain vagueness and uncertainty. We then give four solution methods
of the games which are soft saddle points, soft lover and soft upper val-
ues, soft dominated strategies and soft Nash equilibrium. We also give
an example from the real world which shows that the methods can be
successfully applied to a financial problem. Finally, we extended the two
person soft games to n-person soft games.
Keyword 0.1 Soft sets, two person soft games, soft payoff functions, soft
dominated strategies, soft lover and soft upper values, soft Nash equilib-
rium.
1 Introduction
In 1999, Molodtsov [29] introduced soft set theory for modeling vagueness and
uncertainty. In [29], Molodtsov pointed out several directions for the appli-
cations of soft sets, such as stability and regularization, game theory and op-
erations research, and soft analysis. After Molodtsov, works on soft set the-
ory has been progressing rapidly. For instance; on the theory of soft sets
[3, 13, 14, 26, 30, 31, 32], on the soft decision making [15, 16, 17, 25], on the
algebraic structures soft sets [2, 34, 35, 36] are some of the selected works.
Game theory is originally the mathematical study of competition and coop-
eration. In other words, game theory is a study of strategic decision making
[27]. Game theory was introduced in 1944 with the publication of von Neumann
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and Morgenstern [33]. They started modern game theory with the two-person
zero-sum games and its proof. Game theory is mainly used in many fields such
as; economics, political science, psychology and so on [5]. Ferguson [20] present
various mathematical models of game theory. Binmore [8] focused the coop-
erative and noncooperative game theory. Aliprantis and Chakrabarti [4] give
games with decision making.
In 1965, Zadeh [44] developed the theory of fuzzy sets that is the most appro-
priate theory for dealing with uncertainties. In recent years, many interesting
applications of game theory have been expanded by embedding the ideas of fuzzy
sets. The two person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals game
theory have been studied by many authors (e.g. [6, 10, 11, 12, 21, 23, 24, 40]).
The max-min solution with respect to a degree of attainment of a fuzzy goal
has also been studied (e.g. [1, 19, 39, 38, 42, 43]). Many study of game theory
have been expanded by using the ideas of interval value (e.g. [19, 22, 28]). The-
ory for linear programming problems with fuzzy parameters is introduced (e.g.
[6, 7, 9]).
In the classical and fuzzy games, the payoff functions are reel valued, and
therefore the solution of such games are obtained by using arithmetic opera-
tions. Especially, fuzzy games depend on the fuzzy set that is described by its
membership function. It is mentioned in [29], there exists a difficulty to set
the membership function in each particular case, and also the fuzzy set opera-
tions based on the arithmetic operations with membership functions do not look
natural since the nature of the membership function is extremely individual.
In this work, we propose a game model for dealing with uncertainties which is
free of the difficulties mentioned above. The proposed new game is called a soft
game since it is based on soft sets theory. To construct a soft set we can use any
parametrization with the help of words and sentences, real numbers, functions,
mappings, and so on. Therefore, payoff functions of the soft game are set valued
function and solution of the soft games obtained by using the operations of sets
that make this game very convenient and easily applicable in practice. The
present expository paper is a condensation of part of the dissertation [18].
This work is organized as follows. In the next section, most of the funda-
mental definitions of the operations of soft sets are presented. In Section 3,
we construct two person soft games and then give four solution methods for
the games which are soft saddle points, soft lover and soft upper value, soft
dominated strategies and soft Nash equilibrium. In section 4, we give an ap-
plication for two person soft games. In section 5, we give n-person soft games
that is extension of the two person soft games. In final Section, we concluded
the work.
2 Soft sets
In this section, we present the basic definitions and results of soft set theory
[13]. More detailed explanations related to this subsection may be found in
[13, 26, 29].
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Definition 2.1 [29] Let U be a universe, P (U) be the power set of U and E be
a set of parameters that are describe the elements of U . A soft set S over U is
a set defined by a set valued function S representing a mapping
fS : E → P (U)
It is noting that the soft set is a parametrized family of subsets of the set U , and
therefore it can be written a set of ordered pairs
S = {(x, fS(x)) : x ∈ E}
Here, fS is called approximate function of the soft set S and fS(x) is called
x-approximate value of x ∈ E. The subscript S in the fS indicates that fS is
the approximate function of S.
Generally, fS , fT , fV , ... will be used as an approximate functions of S, T ,
V , ..., respectively.
Note that if fS(x) = ∅, then the element (x, fS(x)) is not appeared in S.
Example 2.2 Suppose that U = {u1, u2, u3, u4} is the universe contains four
cars under consideration in an auto agent and E = {x1, x2, x3, x4} is the set of
parameters, where xi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) stand for ‘safety”, “cheap”, “modern” and
“large”, respectively.
A customer to select a car from the auto agent, can construct a soft set S
that describes the characteristic of cars according to own requests. Assume that
fS(x1) = {u1, u2}, fS(x2) = {u1, u2, u4}, fS(x3) = ∅, fS(x4) = U then the
soft-set S is written by
S = {(x1, {u1, u2}), (x2, {u1, u2, u4}), (x4, U)}
By using same parameter set E, another customer to select a car from the
same auto agent, can construct a soft set T according to own requests. Here T
may be different then S. Assume that fT (x1) = {u1, u2}, fT (x2) = {u1, u2, u3},
fT (x3) = {u1, u2}, fT (x4) = {u1} then the soft-set T is written by
T = {(x1, {u1, u2}), (x2, {u1, u2, u3}), (x3, {u1, u2}), (x4, {u1})}
Definition 2.3 [13] Let S and T be two soft sets. Then,
a) If fS(x) = ∅ for all x ∈ E, then S is called a empty soft set, denoted by SΦ.
b) If fS(x) ⊆ fT (x) for all x ∈ E, then S is a soft subset of T , denoted by S⊆˜T .
Definition 2.4 [13] Let S and T be two soft sets. Then,
a) Complement of S is denoted by S c˜. Its approximate function fSc˜ is defined
by
fSc˜(x) = U \ fS(x) for all x ∈ E
b) Union of S and T is denoted by S∪˜T . Its approximate function fS∪˜T is
defined by
fS∪˜T (x) = fS(x) ∪ fT (x) for all x ∈ E.
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c) Intersection of S and T is denoted by S∩˜T . Its approximate function fS∩˜T
is defined by
fS∩˜T (x) = fS(x) ∩ fT (x) for all x ∈ E.
3 Two Person Soft Games
In this section, we construct two person soft games with soft payoffs. We then
give four solution methods for the games. The basic definitions and preliminaries
of the game theory we refer to [4, 20, 29, 33, 37, 41].
Definition 3.1 Let X,Y are a sets of strategies. A choice of behavior is called
an action. The elements of X × Y are called action pairs. That is, X × Y is
the set of available actions.
Definition 3.2 Let U be a set of alternatives, P (U) be the power set of U , X,Y
are a sets of strategies. Then, a set valued function
fS : X × Y → P (U)
is called a soft payoff function. For each (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the value fS(x, y) is
called a soft payoff.
Definition 3.3 Let X and Y be a set of strategies of Player 1 and 2, respec-
tively, U be a set of alternatives and fSk : X × Y → P (U) be a soft payoff
function for player k, (k = 1, 2). Then, for each Player k, a two person soft
game (tps-game) is defined by a soft set over U as
Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y }
The tps-game is played as follows: at a certain time Player 1 chooses a strategy
xi ∈ X, simultaneously Player 2 chooses a strategy yj ∈ Y and once this is done
each player k (k=1,2) receives the soft payoff fSk(xi, yj).
If X = {x1, x2, ..., xm} and Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn}, then the soft payoffs of Sk
can be arranged in the form of the m× n matrix shown in Table 1.
Sk y1 y2 ... yn
x1 fSk(x1, y1) fSk(x1, y2) ... fSk(x1, yn)
x2 fSk(x2, y1) fSk(x2, y2) ... fSk(x2, yn)
...
...
...
. . .
...
xm fSk(xm, y1) fSk(xm, y2) ... fSk(xm, yn)
Table 1 : The two person soft game
Now, we can give an example for tps-game.
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Example 3.4 Let U = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8, u9, u10}be a set of alterna-
tives, P (U) be the power set of U , X = {x1, x3, x5} and Y = {x1, x2, x4} be a
set of the strategies Player 1 and 2, respectively.
If Player 1 constructs a tps-games as follows,
S1 =
{
((x1, x1), {u1, u2, u5, u8}), (x1, x2), {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u8}), (x1, x4),
{u3, u8}), ((x3, x1), {u1, u3, u7}), (x3, x2), {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7}),
(x3, x4), {u1, u2, u3}), ((x5, x1), {u3, u4, u5, u8}), (x5, x2), {u1, u2, u3,
u4, u5, u6, u8}), (x5, x4), {u1, u2, u3, u8})
}
then the soft payoffs of the game can be arranged as in Table 2,
S1 x1 x2 x4
x1 {u1, u2, u5, u8} {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u8} {u3, u8}
x3 {u1, u3, u7} {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7} {u1, u2, u3}
x5 {u3, u4, u5, u8} {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u8} {u1, u2, u3, u8}
Table 2
Let us explain some element of this game; if Player 1 select x3 and Player
2 select x2, then the value of game will be a set {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7}, that is,
fS1(x3, x2) = {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7}
In this case, Player 1 wins the set of alternatives {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7} and
Player 2 lost the same set of alternatives.
Similarly, if Player 2 constructs a tps-game as follows,
S2 =
{
((x1, x1), {u3, u4, u6, u7}), (x1, x2), {u6, u7}), (x1, x4), {u1, u2, u4,
u5, u6, u7}), ((x3, x1), {u2, u4, u5, u6, u8}), (x3, x2), {u4, u8}), (x3, x4),
{u4, u5, u6, u7, u8}), ((x5, x1), {u1, u2, u6u7}), (x5, x2), {u7}),
(x5, x4), {u4, u5, u6, u7})
}
then the soft payoffs of the game can be arranged as in Table 3,
S2 x1 x2 x4
x1 {u3, u4, u6, u7} {u6, u7} {u1, u2, u4, u5, u6, u7}
x3 {u2, u4, u5, u6, u8} {u4, u8} {u4, u5, u6, u7, u8}
x5 {u1, u2, u6, u7} {u7} {u4, u5, u6, u7}
Table 3
Let us explain some element of this tps-game; if Player 1 select x3 and Player
2 select x2, then the value of game will be a set {u4, u8}, that is,
fS2(x3, x2) = {u4, u8}
In this case, Player 1 wins the set of alternatives {u4, u8} and Player 2 lost
{u4, u8}.
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Definition 3.5 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two person
soft game and (xi, yj), (xr, ys) ∈ X × Y . Then, Player k is called rational, if
the player’s soft payoff satisfies the following conditions:
a) Either fSk(xi, yj) ⊇ f
k
X×Y (xr, ys) or fSk(xr , ys) ⊇ f
k
X×Y (xi, yj)
b) If fSk(xi, yj) ⊇ f
k
X×Y (xr, ys) and fSk(xr, ys) ⊇ f
k
X×Y (xi, yj), then fSk(xi, yj) =
fkX×Y (xr , ys).
Definition 3.6 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two person
soft game. Then, an action (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y is called an optimal action if
fSk(x
∗, y∗) ⊇ fSk(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
Definition 3.7 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two person
soft game. Then,
a) if fSk(xi, yj) ⊃ fSk(xr , ys), we says that a player strictly prefers action pair
(xi, yj) over action (xr , ys),
b) if fSk(xi, yj) = fSk(xr, ys), we says that a player is indifferent between the
two actions,
c) if fSk(xi, yj) ⊇ fSk(xr , ys), we says that a player either prefers (xi, yj) to
(xr , ys) or is indifferent between the two actions.
Definition 3.8 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two person
soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
a) If fSk(x, y) = ∅ for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , then Sk is called a empty soft set,
denoted by SˇΦ.
b) If fSk(x, y) = U for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , then Sk is called a full soft game,
denoted by SˇE.
Now the two person zero sum game on the classical game theory will be
a two person disjoint game on the soft game theory. It is given in following
definition.
Definition 3.9 A tps-game is called a two person disjoint soft game if inter-
section of the soft payoff of players is empty set for each action pairs.
For instance, Example 3.4 is a two person disjoint soft game.
Proposition 3.10 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two
person disjoint soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
i. (S1
c)
c
= S1,
ii. (S2
c
)
c
= S2,
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Proposition 3.11 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two
person disjoint soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
i. S1 \ S2 = S1
ii. S2 \ S1 = S2
iii. S1 ∩ S2 = Sˇφ
Definition 3.12 A tps-game is called a two person universal soft game if union
of the soft payoff of players is universal set for each action pairs.
For instance, Example 3.4 is a two person universal soft game.
Proposition 3.13 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two
person universal soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
i. (Sk
c
)
c
= Sk, k = 1, 2
ii. S1 ∪ S2 = SˇE
Proposition 3.14 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two
person both universal and disjoint soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
i. SˇE \ S2 = S1
ii. SˇE \ S1 = S2
Proposition 3.15 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two
person both universal and disjoint soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
i. (S1
c)
c
= S1,
ii. (S2
c
)
c
= S2,
i. S1
c = S2,
ii. S2
c = S1,
Proposition 3.16 Let Sk = {((x, y), fSk(x, y)) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y } be a two
person both universal and disjoint soft game for k = 1, 2. Then,
i. S1 \ S2 = S1
ii. S2 \ S1 = S2
iii. S1 ∩ S2 = Sˇφ
iv. S1 ∪ S2 = SˇE
Definition 3.17 Let fSk be a soft payoff function of a tps-game Sk. If the
following properties hold
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a)
⋃m
i=1 fSk(xi, yj) = fSk(x, y)
b)
⋂n
j=1 fSk(xi, yj) = fSk(x, y)
then fSk(x, y) is called a soft saddle point of Player k’s in the tps-game.
Note that if fS1(x, y) is a soft saddle point of a tps-game S1, then Player 1 can
then win at least by choosing the strategy x ∈ X , and Player 2 can keep her/his
loss to at most fS1(x, y) by choosing the strategy y ∈ Y . Hence the soft saddle
poind is a value of the tps-game.
Example 3.18 Let U = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8, u9, u10} be a set of alter-
natives, X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} and Y = {y1, y2, y3} be the strategies for Player 1
and 2, respectively. Then, tps-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 4,
S1 y1 y2 y3
x1 {u2, u4, u7} {u4} {u4}
x2 {u5} {u7} {u4, u7}
x3 {u2, u4, u5, u7, u8, u10} {u4, u8} {u7, u8}
x4 {u2, u4, u5, u7, u8} {u1, u4, u7, u8} {u4, u7, u8}
Table 4
Clearly, ⋃4
i=1 fS1(xi, y1) = {u2, u4, u5, u7, u8, u10},⋃4
i=1 fS1(xi, y2) = {u1, u4, u7, u8},⋃4
i=1 fS1(xi, y3) = {u4, u7, u8},
and ⋂3
j=1 fS1(x1, yj) = {u4},⋂3
j=1 fS1(x2, yj) = φ,⋂3
j=1 fS1 = {u8},⋂3
j=1 fS1(x4, yj) = {u4, u7, u8}.
Therefore, {u4, u7, u8} is a soft saddle point of the tps-game, since the intersec-
tion of the forth row is equal to the union of the third column. So, the value of
the tps-game is {u4, u7, u8}.
Note that every tps-game has not a soft saddle point. (For instance, in the above
example, if {u4, u7, u8} is replaced with {u4, u7, u8, u9} in soft payoff fS1(x4, y3),
then a soft saddle point of the game can not be found.) Saddle point can not
be used for a tps-game, soft upper and soft lower values of the tps-game may
be used is given in the following definition.
Definition 3.19 Let fSk be a soft payoff function of a tps-game Sk. Then,
i. Soft upper value of the tps-game, denoted v, is defined by
v = ∩y∈Y (∪x∈X(fSk(x, y)))
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ii. Soft lower value of the tps-game, denoted v, is defined by
v = ∪x∈X(∩y∈Y (fSk(x, y)))
iii. If soft upper and soft lower value of a tps-game are equal, they are called
value of the tps-game, noted by v. That is v = v = v.
Example 3.20 Let us consider Table 4 in Example 3.18. It is clear that soft
upper value v = {u4, u7, u8} and soft lower value v = {u4, u7, u8}, hence v = v.
It means that value of the tps-game is {u4, u7, u8}.
Theorem 3.21 v and v be a soft lower and soft upper value of a tps-game,
respectively. Then, the soft lower value is subset or equal to the soft upper
value, that is,
v ⊆ v
Proof: Assume that v be a soft lower value, v be a soft upper value of a tps-game
and X = {x1, x2, ..., xm} and Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn} are sets of the strategies for
Player 1 and 2, respectively.
We choose x∗i ∈ X and y
∗
j ∈ Y . Then,
v = ∪x∈X(∩y∈Y (fX×Y (x, y)))
⊆ ∩y∈Y (fX×Y (x∗, y))
⊆ fX×Y (x∗, y∗)
⊆ ∪x∈X(fX×Y (x, y∗))
⊆ ∩y∈Y (∪x∈X(fX×Y (x, y)))
i.e.:
v = ∪x∈X(∩y∈Y (fX×Y (x, y))) ⊆ v = ∩y∈Y (∪x∈X(fX×Y (x, y)))
proof is valid.
Example 3.22 Let us consider soft upper value v and soft lower value v in
Example 3.20. It is clear that v = {u4, u7, u8} ⊆ v = {u4, u7, u8}, hence v ⊆ v.
Theorem 3.23 Let fSk(x, y) be a soft saddle point, v be a soft lower value and
v be a soft upper value of a tps-game. Then,
v ⊆ fSk(x
∗, y∗) ⊆ v
Proof: Assume that fSk(x
∗, y∗) be a soft saddle point, v be a soft lower
value, v be a soft upper value of a tps-game and X = {x1, x2, ..., xm} and
Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn} are sets of the strategies for Player 1 and 2, respectively.
We choose x∗i ∈ X and y
∗
j ∈ Y . Then,
Since fSk(x
∗, y∗) is a soft saddle point, we have
m⋃
i=1
fSk(xi, yj) =
n⋂
j=1
fSk(xi, yj) = fSk(x
∗, y∗)
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Clearly,
eVL = ∪x∈X(∩y∈Y (fX×Y (x, y))) ⊆
m⋃
i=1
fSk(xi, yj) = fSk(x
∗, y∗) (1)
and
fSk(x
∗, y∗) =
n⋂
j=1
fSk(xi, yj) ⊆ eVU = ∩y∈Y (∪x∈X(fX×Y (x, y)) (2)
Then, from (1) and (2)
eVL ⊆ fX×Y (x, y) ⊆ eVU
proof is valid.
Corollary 3.24 Let fSk(x, y) be a soft saddle point, v be a soft lower value and
v be a soft upper value of a tps-game. If v = v = v, then fSk(x, y) is exactly v.
Example 3.25 Let us consider Table 4 in Example 3.18 and soft upper value
v and soft lower value v in Example 3.20. It is clear that soft saddle point
fSk(x, y) is exactly v = v = v = {u4, u7, u8}.
Note that in every tps-game, the soft lower value v can not be equals to the soft
upper value v. (For instance, in the above example, if {u4, u7, u8} is replaced
with {u4, u7, u8, u9} in soft payoff fS1(x4, y3), then the soft lower value v can
not be equals to the soft upper value v.) If in a tps-game v 6= v, then to get
the solution of the game soft dominated strategy may be used. We define soft
dominated strategy for tps-game as follows.
Definition 3.26 Let S1 be a tps-game with its soft payoff function fS1 . Then,
a) a strategy xi ∈ X is called a soft dominated to another strategy xr ∈ X, if
fS1(xi, y) ⊇ fS1(xr , y) for all y ∈ Y ,
b) a strategy yj ∈ Y is called a soft dominated to another strategy ys ∈ Y , if
fS1(x, yj) ⊆ fS1(x, ys) for all x ∈ X
By using soft dominated strategy, tps-games may be reduced by deleting rows
and columns that are obviously bad for the player who uses them. This process
of eliminating soft dominated strategies sometimes leads us to a solution of
a tps-game. Such a method of solving tps-game is called a soft elimination
method.
The following tps-game can be solved by using the method.
Example 3.27 Let U = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8, u9, u10} be a set of alter-
natives, X = {x1, x2, x3} and Y = {y1, y2, y3} be the strategies for Player 1 and
2, respectively. Then, tps-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 5,
S1 y1 y2 y3
x1 {u2, u4, u7} {u4} {u4}
x2 {u5} {u7} {u4, u7}
x3 {u2, u4, u5, u7, u8, u10} {u4, u7, u8} {u4, u7, u8}
10
Table 5
The last column is dominated by the middle column. Deleting the last column
we can obtain Table 6 as:
S1 y1 y2
x1 {u2, u4, u7} {u4}
x2 {u5} {u7}
x3 {u2, u4, u5, u7, u8, u10} {u4, u7, u8}
Table 6
Now, in Table 6, the top row is dominated by the bottom row. (Note that this is
not the case in Table 5). Deleting the top row we obtain Table 7 as:
S1 y1 y2
x2 {u5} {u7}
x3 {u2, u4, u5, u7, u8, u10} {u4, u7, u8}
Table 7
In Table 7, Player 1 has a soft dominant strategy x3 so that x2 is now elimi-
nated. Player 2 can now choose between y1 and y2 and she/he will clearly choose
y2. The solution using the method is (x3, y2), that is, value of the tps-game is
{u4, u7, u8}.
Note that the soft elimination method cannot be used for some tps-games which
do not have a soft dominated strategies. In this case, we can use soft Nash
equilibrium that is defined as follows.
Definition 3.28 Let Sk be a tps-game with its soft payoff function fSk for
k = 1, 2. If the following properties hold
a) fS1(x
∗, y∗) ⊇ fS1(x, y
∗) for each x ∈ X
b) fS2(x
∗, y∗) ⊇ fS2(x
∗, y) for each y ∈ Y
then, (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y is called a soft Nash equilibrium of a tps-game.
Note that if (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y is a soft Nash equilibrium of a tps-game, then
Player 1 can then win at least fS1(x
∗, y∗) by choosing strategy x∗ ∈ X , and
Player 2 can win at least fS2(x
∗, y∗) by choosing strategy y∗ ∈ Y . Hence the
soft Nash equilibrium is an optimal action for tps-game, therefore, fSk(x
∗, y∗)
is the solution of the tps-game for Player k, k = 1, 2.
Following game, given in Example 3.29, can be solved by soft Nash equilib-
rium, but it is very difficult to solve by using the others methods.
Example 3.29 Let U = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8, u9, u10} be a set of alter-
natives, X = {x1, x2, x3} and Y = {y1, y2, y3} be the strategies Player 1 and
and 2, respectively. Then, tps-game of Player 1 is given as in Table 8,
S1 y1 y2 y3
x1 {u1, u2, u4, u7, u8, u9} {u1, u2, u4, u7, u8} {u1, u2, u3, u4, u7, u8}
x2 {u1, u2, u3, u5} {u1, u4, u7, u8} {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u7}
x3 {u2, u5, u7, u8, u10} {u2, u4, u7, u8} {u4, u5, u7, u8, u10}
11
Table 8
and tps-game of Player 2 is given as in Table 9,
S2 y1 y2 y3
x1 {u3, u5, u6, u10} {u3, u5, u6, u9, u10} {u5, u6, u9, u10}
x2 {u4, u6, u7, u8, u9, u10} {u2, u3, u5, u6, u9, u10} {u6, u8, u9, u10}
x3 {u1, u3, u4, u6, u9} {u1, u3, u5, u6, u9, u10} {u1, u2, u3, u6, u9}
Table 9
From the tables, we have
a) fS1(x1, y2) ⊇ fS1(x, y2) for each x ∈ X , and
b) fS2(x1, y2) ⊇ fS2(x1, y) for each y ∈ Y
then, (x1, y2) ∈ X × Y is a soft Nash equilibrium. Therefore, fS1(x1, y2) =
{u1, u2, u4, u7, u8} and fS2(x1, y2) = {u3, u5, u6, u9, u10} are the solution of the
tps-game for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively.
4 An Application
In this section, we give a financial problem that are solved by using both soft
dominated strategy and soft saddle point methods.
There are two companies, say Player 1 and Player 2, who competitively
want to increase sale of produces in the country. Therefore, they give ad-
vertisements. Assume that two companies have a set of different products
U = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8} where for i = 1, 2, ..., 8, the product ui stand
for “oil”, “salt”,, “honey”, “ jam”, “ cheese”, “sugar”, “cooker”, and “jar”, re-
spectively. The products can be characterized by a set of strategy X = Y =
{xi : i = 1, 2, 3} which contains styles of advertisement where for j = 1, 2, 3, the
strategies xj stand for “TV”, “radio” and “ newspaper”, respectively.
Suppose that X = {x1, x2, x3} and Y = {y1 = x1, y2 = x2, y3 = x3} are
strategies of Player 1 and 2, respectively. Then, a tps-game of Player 1 is given
as in Table 10.
S1 y1 y2 y3
x1 {u1, u2, u3, u5, u8} {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u8} {u3}
x2 {u1, u3, u7} {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7} {u2, u3}
x3 {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5} {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u8} {u1, u2, u3}
Table 10
In Table 10, let us explain action pair (x1, y1); if Player 1 select x1 = ”TV ”
and Player 2 select y1 = ”TV ”, then the soft payoff of Player 1 is a set
{u1, u2, u3, u5, u8}, that is,
fS1(x1, y1) = {u1, u2, u3, u5, u8}
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In this case, Player 1 increase sale of {u1, u2, u3, u5, u8} and Player 2 decrease
sale of {u1, u2, u3, u5, u8}.
We can now solve the game. It is seen in Table 10,
{u1, u2, u3, u5, u8} ⊆ {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u8}
{u1, u3, u7} ⊆ {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7}
{u1, u2, u3, u4, u5} ⊆ {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u8}
the middle column is dominated by the light column. We then deleting the
middle column we obtain Table 11.
S1 y1 y3
x1 {u1, u2, u3, u5, u8} {u3}
x2 {u1, u3, u7} {u2, u3}
x3 {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5} {u1, u2, u3}
Table 11
In Table 11, there is no another soft dominated strategy, we can use soft saddle
point method.
⋃3
i=1 fS1(xi, y1) = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u7, u8}
⋃3
i=1 fS1(xi, y3) = {u1, u2, u3}
⋂
j=1,3 fS1(x1, yj) = {u3}
⋂
j=1,3 fS1(x2, yj) = {u3}
⋂
j=1,3 fS1(x3, yj) = {u1, u2, u3}
Here, optimal strategy of the game is (x3, y3) since
3⋃
i=1
fS1(xi, y3) =
⋂
j=1,3
fS1(x3, yj)
Therefore, value of the tps-game is {u1, u2, u3}.
5 n-Person Soft Games
In many applications the soft games can be often played between more than
two players. Therefore, tps-games can be extended to n-person soft games.
Definition 5.1 Let U be a set of alternatives, P (U) be the power set of U and
Xk is the set of strategies of Player k, (k = 1, 2, ..., n). Then, for each Player
k, an n-person soft game (nps-game) is defined by a soft set over U as
Snk = {((x1, x2, ..., xn), fSnk (x1, x2, ..., xn)) : (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ X1×X2× ...×Xn}
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where fSn
k
is a soft payoff function of Player k.
The nps-game is played as follows: at a certain time Player 1 chooses a
strategy x1 ∈ X1 and simultaneously each Player k (k = 2, ..., n) chooses a
strategy xk ∈ Xk and once this is done each player k receives the soft payoff
fSn
k
(x1, x2, ..., xn).
Definition 5.2 Let Snk = {((x1, x2, ..., xn), fSnk (x1, x2, ..., xn)) : (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈
X1 ×X2 × ...×Xn} be an nps-game. Then, a strategy xk ∈ Xk is called a soft
dominated to another strategy x ∈ Xk, if
fSn
k
(x1, ..., xk−1, xk, xk+1, ..., xn) ⊇ fSn
k
(x1, ..., xk−1, x, xk+1, ..., xn)
for each strategy xi ∈ Xi of player i (i = 1, 2, ...k − 1, k + 1, ..., n), respectively.
Definition 5.3 Let Snk = {((x1, x2, ..., xn), fSnk (x1, x2, ..., xn)) : (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈
X1 ×X2 × ...×Xn} be an nps-game. If for each player k (k=1,2,...,n) the fol-
lowing properties hold
fSn
k
(x∗1, ..., x
∗
k−1, x
∗
k, x
∗
k+1, ..., x
∗
n) ⊇ fSnk (x
∗
1, ..., x
∗
k−1, x, x
∗
k+1, ..., x
∗
n)
for each x ∈ Xk, then (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n) ∈ S
n
k is called a soft Nash equilibrium of
an nps-game.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we first present the basic definitions and results of soft set theory.
We then construct tps-games with soft payoffs. We also give four solution meth-
ods for the tps-games with examples. To applied the game to the real world
problem we give an example which shows the methods can be successfully ap-
plied to a financial problem. Finally, we extended the two person soft games to
n-person soft games. The soft games may be applied to many fields and more
comprehensive in the future to solve the related problems, such as; computer
science, decision making, and so on.
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